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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950246-CA 
v. : 
BRIAN MAGUIRE : Priority No. 3 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Brian Maguire appeals the trial court's denial of 
his motion to correct sentence (R. 765). The trial court imposed 
the sentence on defendant's plea to aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995) (R. 
632). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
1 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES ANP STANDARDS QF APPELLATE REVIEW1 
1. Can defendant establish ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel based on counsel's failure to challenge the legality of 
his second sentence either at the time the trial court imposed it 
or on direct appeal when defendant can challenge the legality of 
his sentence at any time? 
This claim presents a question of law reviewed on the trial 
record because defendant presents it for the first time on appeal 
without a prior evidentiary hearing. State v. Ellifritz. 835 
P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). 
2, Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1995) preclude a more 
severe second sentence against a defendant after he has rescinded 
the plea agreement that resulted in the earlier, more lenient 
sentence? 
Because this issue involves the interpretation of statutes 
defendant has filed both his original brief and a 
"supplemental" brief. With one exception, the supplemental brief 
contains the complete text of the arguments raised in defendant's 
original brief; therefore, it appears defendant intends his 
supplemental brief to be a replacement brief, and the State will 
address only the issues raised in that brief. 
The only issue not restated in the supplemental brief is 
whether the trial court erroneously refused defendant's motion to 
transcribe the relevant proceedings at the State's expense. 
Because the State has since ordered those transcripts, that issue 
is now moot. 
2 
and case law, it presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). 
3. Does double jeopardy require that defendant receive 
credit for the time he served on his parole revocation for a 
murder conviction against his sentence imposed on his guilty plea 
to aggravated assault? 
This presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Davis. 903 P.2d 940, 943 (Utah 1995), cert» granted, 
(Utah 1996). However, defendant's failure to raise this issue in 
the trial court and failure on appeal to establish plain error or 
exceptional circumstances precludes appellate review of the 
merits of this issue. State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
4. Does double jeopardy preclude imposing a higher 
sentence after defendant successfully challenges his no contest 
plea even though the trial court credited the full time he served 
on the original sentence against the subsequent sentence? 
See standard of review for issue three. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-402 
(1995)(conviction to next lower degree), 76-3-405 
(1995)(limitation on second sentence for same crime), 76-5-103 
3 
(1995) (aggravated assault), 76-5-105 (1995)(mayhem), and 76-8-
1001 (1990)(habitual criminal statute); and rule 22(e), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASK 
By information dated December 7, 1987, the State charged 
defendant with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and 
mayhem, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
5-103 (1995) and 76-5-105 (1995) (R. 28). By amended information 
dated January 2, 1988, the State added a third count charging 
defendant with being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 31-33). 
On April 21, 1988, defendant pleaded no contest to 
aggravated assault, and the trial court granted the State's 
motion to dismiss the other two counts (R. 111-113). On April 
22, 1988, the trial court lowered the degree to a class A 
misdemeanor and sentenced defendant to not more than one year in 
prison to run concurrently with any other sentences (R. 114). 
By letter dated June 27, 1988, defendant moved to withdraw 
his no contest plea (R. 116, 121). Defendant filed a formal 
motion to withdraw his plea on August 10, 1988 (R. 124). The 
2The editions cited contain the statutory language in effect 
in 1987. 
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trial court denied his motion (R. 260) - This Court reversed that 
determination in an unpublished opinion, and the supreme court 
affirmed this Court's disposition. state v. Macruire. 830 P.2d 
216, 217-18 (Utah 1991). 
On remand, defendant again pleaded guilty to aggravated 
assault, and the State again moved to dismiss the mayhem and 
habitual criminal charges (R. 571, 625-26, 866-68). 
On this plea, the trial court imposed the statutorily 
prescribed zero-to-five-year prison sentence and ordered it to 
run consecutively with any other sentences defendant was then 
serving (R. 632, 881-87). The trial court also gave defendant 
credit for the time he served on his previous no contest plea (R. 
632, 880). 
Defendant filed a motion to correct the sentence, contending 
that the trial court illegally imposed the zero-to-five-year 
consecutive sentence because it was more severe than the sentence 
imposed on his original no-contest plea (R. 636-54, 739-45). The 
trial court denied the motion in a signed minute entry dated 
March 17, 1995 (R. 765) .3 Defendant timely filed his notice of 
appeal challenging the denial of his motion to correct sentence 
3The minute entry has no file stamp date. 
5 
(R. 7 7 4 ) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While on parole from a prior murder conviction, defendant 
tore off the top third of his grandmother's ear (R. 29, 111, 408, 
443, 447-50, €26) . 
After the State charged defendant, a parole supervisor filed 
an information on parole violation, citing the mayhem and 
aggravated assault charges as two of four bases for revoking 
parole (R. 133, 654, 663, 670, 700). 
The State charged defendant with aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony; mayhem, a second degree felony; and being an 
habitual criminal, a first degree felony (R. 31-33). Defendant 
ultimately pleaded no contest to the third degree felony 
aggravated assault charge in exchange for the State's agreement 
to dismiss the mayhem and habitual criminal charges, to recommend 
reducing the third degree felony aggravated assault to a class A 
misdemeanor, and to permit him to withdraw the plea if the trial 
court refused the reduced sentence recommendation (R. 111-12; Tr. 
April 21, 1988 at 2, 5-6, 8-9). The trial court granted the 
motion to reduce the sentence, sentenced defendant to a prison 
term not to exceed one year, and ordered the prison sentence to 
run concurrently with any other sentence (R. 114; Tr. April 21, 
6 
1988 at 14-15). 
In reliance on his no-contest plea to aggravated assault, 
the Board of Pardons revoked defendant's parole on the prior 
murder conviction (R. 133, 655, 670, 673). Defendant remains 
incarcerated on the parole revocation (R. 877). 
Defendant succeeded on an appellate challenge to his no-
contest plea. State v. Maouire. 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992). 
Part way through his trial on the reinstated charges, 
defendant initiated plea negotiations (R. 863). Pursuant to the 
resulting plea agreement, defendant again pleaded guilty to third 
degree felony aggravated assault, and the State again moved to 
dismiss the mayhem and habitual criminal charges (R. 571, 625-26, 
866-68). This time, however, defendant did not move for and the 
State did not agree to recommend reducing the sentence to a class 
A misdemeanor (isLJ . Consequently, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to a zero-to-five year prison term without any 
objection from defendant (R. 632, 881-87). Over defendant's 
objection, the trial court also ordered the sentence to run 
consecutively with defendant's sentence on his revoked parole 
(idJ. 
In a subsequent motion to correct his sentence, defendant 
challenged both the increased prison term and the order making 
7 
the sentence consecutive (R. 636-54, 379-45). 
The argument sections below contain additional relevant 
facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Ineffective assistance. Defendant contends trial 
counsel provided him with inadequate representation because 
counsel did not challenge the legality of defendant's sentence 
either at the time the trial court imposed it or by means of 
direct appeal. However, defendant has not established either 
element of an ineffectiveness claim. First, defendant has not 
established deficient performance: nothing in this record shows 
that he ever instructed counsel to file a motion to correct the 
sentence or to challenge its legality on direct appeal. Second, 
defendant has not and cannot establish the failure undermines 
confidence in the outcome. Because defendant can challenge the 
legality of his sentence at any time, he can and is fully 
litigating its legality. 
2. Limitation on harsher sentences. Defendant contends 
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1995) precluded imposing a 
second, harsher sentence after he successfully challenged the no-
contest plea that supported the first, more lenient sentence. No 
Utah cases have considered how this section applies to 
8 
convictions obtained and sentences imposed pursuant to plea 
agreements. However, when defendant successfully challenged his 
original plea, he rescinded the original plea agreement, 
requiring the trial court to return the parties to their pre-
agreement positions. That remedy required treating defendant as 
though the first sentence never existed; therefore, the statute's 
protections were never triggered. 
3. Double jeopardy. Defendant claims double jeopardy 
precluded imposing a sentence on his aggravated assault plea that 
runs consecutively to his prison term on his parole revocation 
because the both prison terms arise from the same facts. 
Defendant failed to preserve this argument below and has not 
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal; 
therefore, the Court need not reach its merits. Alternatively, 
double jeopardy permits using the same facts to support both a 
criminal conviction and a parole revocation; therefore, the 
argument also fails on its merits. 
4. Completion of first sentence. Defendant contends that 
double jeopardy, due process, and equal protection precluded 
imposing the second sentence because he had completed the first. 
Defendant failed to preserve this argument below and has not 
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal; 
9 
therefore, the Court need not reach its merits. Moreover, 
defendant supports the argument with no analysis or authority; 
this independently relieves the court of considering the claim on 
its merits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT MAY CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF A 
SENTENCE AT ANY TIME, HE CANNOT ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED ON COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 
CHALLENGE THE ILLEGALITY AT SENTENCING OR ON DIRECT 
APPEAL 
In Point II of his supplemental brief, defendant claims 
trial counsel represented him ineffectively by not challenging 
the legality of his second sentence either at the time the trial 
court imposed it or on direct appeal.4 In order to establish he 
4In Point I, defendant claims that the trial court abused 
its discretion by refusing to correct his allegedly illegal 
sentence. The State concedes that, if this Court determines the 
sentence is illegal, then the trial court committed reversible 
error by not correcting it. 
In that same argument, defendant complains that the trial 
court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion. To the 
extent defendant intends this statement as a separate basis for 
reversal, he fails to support it with any authority or legal 
analysis establishing why the trial court should have held such a 
hearing. That failure precludes consideration of the argument's 
merits. State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 
1984)(refusing to consider a issue that Amicone supported with no 
legal authority or analysis). Moreover, defendant's claim 
presents a legal question based on largely undisputed facts; 
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did not receive the level of representation guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment, defendant has the burden of establishing t .wo 
I • ' „,r 1,.,^ a n d 
establish that they fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. " :. icKiana v . v. ,,.^: .., ,. L ^ b , cc'.-
69G
 vJL^w-*, , luisons v. Bari:c: L, o ;x r .2d 516, 521 (Utah) , Q g r £ =. 
denied, 1.] 5 S. Ct. ""• '"" Second, he - :-f affirmatively 
}'i I " i I . • . - , ] i t : r • .je 
outcome tnd_y,, Was.:.. :,:> -t V at 6S^r ^ -^::^ -» . 
^arnes. 8 .-*. ~~ . because Lhtit i*«^  been no prior 
evidentiary rearing, defendant must establish both el ements on 
the trial record, State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d at 175. 
I-ei^ ;,- . . , • : . . - • :. hi , I he 
record does ncr establish that defendant ever requested his 
counsel to challenge the legality of his second sentence either 
j_n a m otion to correct the sentence h)f-~* ^-^^^. 
validity of counsel's decisions depends critically cr 
c*-: -. . "I, 'J ^liicKXgilld» "I'<'< \ 11.11 
investigation decisions are reasonable ^-r^nds critically on 
[information suppiiea .,7 . , . . Moreover, dnfendant 
therefore, nc :-eed existed for ar> evidentiary hearing. 
fired his counsel.only two and one-half months after sentencing, 
and one and one-half months after filing his pro se motion to 
correct sentence (R. 625, 739, 770). Defendant may have filed 
the motion without first consulting his attorney and may have 
already ceased all communications with his attorney. Because the 
existing record lacks any evidence of the bases for counsel's 
conduct and the existing record suggests defendant began to 
excluded counsel from defendant's decision to challenge the 
sentence, it cannot support defendant's claim of deficient 
performance. State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); StSte Y, Johnson, 823 
P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991). 
Second, defendant has not and cannot establish that 
counsel's conduct undermines confidence in the outcome. 
Counsel's failure to challenge the sentence's illegality at the 
time the trial court imposed it or in a direct appeal in no way 
impairs defendant's ability to raise the issue later. Rule 
22 (e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permits defendants to 
challenge the legality of sentences at any time. Despite the 
absence of a direct appeal from the sentencing, defendant can and 
is fully litigating the legality of his sentence; therefore, 
counsel's conduct has not affected the outcome. 
12 
In shon defender r 
element of his ineffective assistance claim, and his failure to 
estai ,1 i, ^-t -. L~- ~ --~ . -^iin. 
POINT II 
THE STATUTORY PROSCRIPTION AGAINST IMPOSING A HIGHER 
SENTENCE ON RECONVICTION FOR THE SAME CRIME DOES NOT 
APPLY WHEN A DEFENDANT RESCINDS A PLEA AGREEMENT 
BECAUSE THE RESCISSION REQUIRES TREATING THE ORIGINAL 
SENTENCE AS THOUGH IT :." :> NEVER EXISTED 
Delencldiii „", uLeiidLi + >,I9S5, 
precluded both the higher prison term and the consecutive 
sentence imposed en his second plea t;, .-aggravated assault after 
h e si *-•=-"-" • - .... e 
defendant rescinded the o r i a m a l agreement, the parties must be 
tiedU-d ds though defendant had never been previously sentenced, 
and the statute s protections therefuie uu , . 
Pursuant to the original plea agreemer defendant 
111 eadfjii i |i i i ! ! ', I i i dLjyravdt. ti.»! disfr-.du il I , i I I'm i i 11 degree felony- ^ 
defendant's argument relies solely on the protections 
afforded by Utah Code Ann § 76-3-405 (1995) Defendant has not 
claimed that double jeopardy precluded the harsher sentence, and 
the case i.av. clearly establishes that double jeopardy presents no 
bar to a second harsher sentence after a successful challenge to 
the origi:.£..: conviction or sentence. North Carolina v. Pearce. 
395 U.S. 711, 719-22 (1969) . Defendant also articulates no claim 
that the second sentence violated the due process proscription 
against vindictive second sentences. Id, a! 7^^-"*r 
13 
the State dismissed the mayhem (second degree felony) and 
habitual criminal (first degree felony) charges; 3) the State 
recommended reducing the aggravated assault conviction from a 
third degree felony to a class A misdemeanor; and 4) the State 
agreed that defendant could withdraw his plea if the trial court 
did not grant the reduction (R. Ill, 113, Tr. April 21, 1988 at 
2-3, 8). The trial court granted the reduction and sentenced 
defendant accordingly, imposing a prison term not to exceed one 
year to run concurrently with any other prison sentences. 
Defendant successfully challenged the original plea on the 
basis of a technical violation of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. State v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992). After 
the State put on seven witnesses at the retrial, defendant 
initiated plea negotiations (R. 570-71, 863) . Pursuant to the 
resulting agreement: 1) defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony; and 2) the State dismissed the 
mayhem and habitual criminal charges (R. 571, 625-26, 866-68) . 
However, defendant did not ask for and the State did not again 
recommend the classification reduction. Consequently, the trial 
court sentenced defendant to the statutory prison term of zero-
to-five years to run consecutively with defendant's sentence on 
the prior murder charge (R. 632, 881-82). 
14 
Utah Code 
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on 
•'' direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall 
not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a 
different offense based on the same conduct which is 
more severe than the prior sentence le^s the nortim of 
the pricr sentence previously satisfied. 
l
 t\e statute precludes adding 
new penal elements or augmenting any element wh<°ri impneinii a 
second sentence -ffc~ successfully challenging a conviction. 
iiaiic . ,^ £^1**.-.- However, no 
Utah cases ha\ • ;nsidered how this section applies to 
convictioi is obtained ^.^ sentences imposed pursuant to p ] ea 
agreements. Where, as her^ dis-
agreement, the statute's protections should -:ot apply because the 
roc-efrf t ., _ sentence as though it had 
never existed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that *[a] plea bargain 
is a contractual re] at: :i c >nsh i j: : • i i i "I'MI 11 m nit- .1 iiei di J \ HI I s p c i s s t d 
St&tg V, West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1 988) See also State v. 
I %
 i n o I -an , 3 ? re mi in I" :i in I" : mi i in in "in ir i "i i i i i i t in .««-. ". ,, A _>«. —^--4- - , , - i . 
d j ' j j c i x c t i A v q t i" J in I \ i i .«n u'Ou •.cippo.ying contract 
principles to analyze the voluntariness of a plea purfliirii i i i 
p^uc* Laivjui.. . Defendant's successful challenge to the original 
plea rescinded **iJLjfc J L J U 
15 
Estelle. 656 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1981) (u*an appellant's 
successful challenge to his plea bargaining sentence is a tacit 
repudiation of the bargain, allowing the Government to prosecute 
him on the greater charges'") (citation omitted), cert, denied. 
455 U.S. 953 (1992). When parties rescind an agreement, the 
courts must, to the extent possible, return them to their pre-
agreement positions. Dugan v. Jones. 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 
1986). This requires the parties to give back the benefits they 
received under the agreement. See id. In essence, the contract 
is treated as though it never existed. The same remedy generally 
applies to a rescinded plea agreement. See fttertiines V> Smith/ 
602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979) (if defendant is allowed to 
withdraw his plea, fairness requires "that the case should revert 
to its status on the original charge as it was before the 
agreement to enter his plea of guilty")/ State v. Gentry. 797 
P.2d 456, 459 n.4 (Utah App. 1990) (dicta) (acknowledging return 
to pre-agreement positions is the usual remedy, but explaining 
why it could not be applied in that case). 
In this case, returning the parties to their pre-agreement 
position requires treating defendant as though the trial court 
had imposed no previous sentence because the trial court had 
imposed no sentence at the pre-agreement stage. Therefore, 
16 
returning the parties io ^X^-LJL pie-agreement position makes tl le 
statute's protections inapplicable: because the trial court had 
not sentenced df f Midniil '•' i • '" ' ' " • MLMMIV. nl , i I, 
statutes' protections had i.c: been triaaeiei.* 
i I i i} c: tl: ie:i i ,'MIJI I I, it; 61^'^ —— ~ — l:-v- f u l l b e n e f i t o f 
the remedy to which defendant's rescission entitled it. 
Defendant's rescission required him, r,. return all :f the benefit 
from a third degree felonv to a class A misdemeanor. If the 
State L(.j"i ild never obtain anything more than a class A misdemeanor 
sentence for third, second, and first degr ee fe3 oriips r\pr 
would retain the benefits he sought from, the repudiated agreement 
c result 
would net return the parties to their pre-agreement positions. 
fcThis approach w. ciisc . u trie proscriptions 
established in Sorensen. As t1 oreme court recognizee _.: . .a -
case, the statute precludes * I# harsher sentence. State v. 
Sorens £D 639 P.2d at. 180-Bl. Because returning the parties to 
their pre-agreement positions requires treating the first 
sentence as though it never existed, there is no prior sentence 
with which to compare the sentence imposed on defendant's second 
plea. 
-:ieuuc*:.- .- t*i<aL j+"^  could, re-charge him 
with ail three of " intends that the 
State could never single class A 
misdemeanor sentence, __„ ar.4 ' — ^ - w m w ^ d j . Brief at 23. 
Defendant correctly contends that nothing in section 76-3-
405 expressly excludes rescinded plea agreements from its 
protections. However, prior cases have recognized limitations on 
section 76-3-405fs protections in situations not expressly 
excluded by that section. In State v. Babbel. 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 
1991), cert, denied. 502 U.S. 1036 (1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that section 76-3-405 does not preclude correcting an 
illegal sentence even though correcting the sentence may increase 
it: because the illegal sentence was void, it created no rights. 
Id. at 88. 
Here, defendant's rescission required him to relinquish any 
rights he had to the original sentence and required the trial 
court to return the parties to their pre-agreement positions. 
Defendant's necessary relinquishment of any rights in the 
original sentence equates to the lack of any rights Babbel had to 
an illegal, but more lenient sentence. Therefore, as in Babbel. 
section 76-3-405, should not preclude defendant's second, harsher 
sentence. 
In sum, section 76-3-405 should not preclude imposing a 
longer and consecutive prison term under the facts of this case. 
When defendant challenged the original plea that resulted in the 
prior, more lenient sentence, he rescinded the plea agreement 
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that generated that sentence The parties ::ad r. -p returned to 
"Jj^ .ii |. M ay r ehMm.nL ana pre-sentence posit^^iio, *.. --iiect, 
treating the original sentence as thougn iu nad never existed 
As a result, the statute'r protections had not been triggered. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY PERMITS PUNISHING DEFENDANT SEPARATELY 
FOR THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND THE RESULTING REVOCATION 
OF V*T? PAR~T.F ON " " - P T H P MURDER CONVICTION 
In Point -.v of his supplemental brief, defendant c ontends 
that, unless he receives credit against hi; aggravated assau-t 
£ ^ r " • " " - • - - ; •• ~ 
revocation, the State wfci. Danish him twice icr the same offense. 
According Lu defendant, this violates the proscription against 
double jeopardy. 
Defendant di:? r.ct make this argument t the trial court and 
lias aiqiied IU'JIIM I |" I 11 i 11 * inn inn i: xceptiuiial circumstances on 
appeal herefore, the Court need not consider the argument on • 
its meritL . v. Brown. P56 P,2d ^ c o ^ ~ /—-t- -
Alternatively, the argument t a u . ,/K .*S merit.-. ; effect, 
defendant' '
 t i- .. j. _ e consecutive 
sentence because the aggravated assault guil^v plea caused hv 
parole revocation on the sentence for his mux der conviction. The 
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case law establishes the contrary: double jeopardy permits using 
the same facts to support both a criminal conviction and a parole 
revocation. Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336# 1337 (Utah 1986). 
Because the same conduct supports both the revocation of parole 
on the prior sentence and defendant's sentence for his new 
conviction, the trial court could impose a separate, consecutive 
sentence for defendant's separate aggravated assault conviction. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE AND HAS NOT SUPPORTED HIS 
APPELLATE CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT IMPOSE A 
SECOND SENTENCE BECAUSE HE HAD SATISFIED THE FIRST 
Finally, defendant contends that, because he completed the 
class A misdemeanor sentence imposed on his original no-contest 
plea, double jeopardy, due process, and equal protection 
precluded imposing the statutory zero-to-five year prison term on 
his second guilty plea to the same offense. Defendant attempts 
to draw a distinction between cases where an appellate court 
vacates an active sentence with a case, such as this, where 
defendant had actually completed the original sentence. 
Defendant did not make this argument to the trial court and 
has argued neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances on 
appeal. Therefore, the Court need not consider the argument on 
its merits. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993); 
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State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992). 
Moreover, defendant supports this argument with no analysis 
or case authority. He me 
without establishing thai :^iires a different result 
independent ly IIM-1 le v MS . . ....ung L:-IS ,^^im on the 
merits. *_: i». --j^. -. ~^ \<*) \J,; uuaLe v. Amic:; oo^
 r.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (refusing to consider a issue tna: Airiiccne 
supported > i I III n I i I u . •. . 
The constitutional protections against double jeopardy 
. > . o grant a^i^ixuant credit icr the time 
he served on the original sentence against " -.--*. 
North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 XJ,S, 711, 718-21 (1969) . The trial 
('Mi1 1'iti " •'efendcint \: ii»i . 'I1 ' ' skived .. .:.-<; 
original sentence , Li Li U j . Therefore, defendant received 
all Llidt the constitution guaranteed him, in his second sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the State asks that the Court 
a f f i i"in d e £ e n d a i "i I t w e 111: w J I e « . 
ORAL .ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Whether L.a:* L^dt Ann § 7f •* **= /-.~~r> preciu(jed the 
second, more severe B ein t fi 11 <" i 11 j, e h L 1 1 . . i J i Il 
first impression i n this State noted above, the statute does 
not expressly exclude this case from its protections. Therefore, 
the State seeks oral argument to address any questions the Court 
may have about this issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \2> day of /YltuJ 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-402 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2cL — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
§ 552. 
C.J.S. — 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1522, 
1523. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 1210. 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense 
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being 
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant 
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the 
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to 
be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor 
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class 
A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is 
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of 
probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his 
probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, 
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the 
interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the 
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense 
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining 
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-402, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-402; 1983, ch. 88, § 6; 
1991, ch. 7, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29,1991, twice substituted 
"degree" for "category* in Subsection (1), in-
serted "third degree" and "class A" in the intro-
ductory paragraph of Subsection (2), twice in-
serted "class A" in Subsection (2Xa), added the 
subsection designations in Subsection (2Kb), 
added Subsections (2XbXiii) and (3), redesig-
nated former Subsection (3) as present Subsec-
tion (4), and made minor changes in punctua-
tion and style throughout the section. 
Cross-References. — Expungement and 
sealing of records, § 77-18-9 et seq.; Rule 
4-207, Rules of Judicial Administration. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appeal. 
Applicability of 1991 amendment. 
Felonies. 
Cited. 
Appeal. 
When a conviction is reduced under this 
section, the appeal lies in the court having 
jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded in 
the judgment of conviction and for which defen-
dant is sentenced, rather than the degree of 
88 
76-3-405 CRIMINAL CODE 
an adult defendant's juvenile history in the 
pre-sentence report and its consideration by 
the sentencing judge; the section prohibits use 
of the juvenile record in the guilt phase of a 
criminal trial, but not in the sentencing phase. 
State v. McClendon, 611 R2d 728 (Utah 1980). 
Rescinding recommendation for evalua-
tion. 
Judge may rescind his oral recommendation 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-405, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-405. 
ANALYSIS 
Appeal to district court from justice court. 
Attorney's misstatement of law. 
Finality of sentence. 
In general. 
Purpose of section. 
Second sentence less severe. 
Second sentence more severe. 
Cited. 
Appeal to district court from justice court. 
At a trial de novo in district court on appeal 
from a conviction in a justice court, district 
court could not sentence defendant upon con-
viction to a more severe sentence than imposed 
by justice court. Wisden v. District Court, 694 
P.2d 605 (Utah 1984), aflTd, 737 P.2d 981 (Utah 
1987). 
Attorneys misstatement of law. 
Defendant's allegation that he failed to ap-
peal his conviction due to his attorney's advice 
that he stood a substantial chance of receiving 
a much harsher sentence upon a retrial, such 
advice being a misstatement of the law as 
provided by this section, entitled defendant to 
challenge his conviction by a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus where defendant also alleged 
for the 90-day evaluation and impose the 
proper prison sentence when the oral recom-
mendation has not been made part of the judg-
ment and, since it is not part of the judgment, 
its rescission is not appealable. State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978). 
that he was required to appear at trial in prison 
clothing, which allegation if true would consti-
tute a violation of his constitutional due process 
rights. Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 
1980). 
Finality of sentence. 
Concurrent sentences orally ordered by 
judge, but not signed in order to continue 
sentencing hearing for reconsideration of sen-
tence, were not "set aside" on direct review or 
collateral attack within the meaning of this 
section. Therefore, the court's later imposition 
of consecutive sentences did not violate this 
section. State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
In general. 
•Has section's prohibition against a more se-
vere second sentence requires that the second 
sentence cannot exceed the first sentence in 
appearance or effect, in the number of its ele-
ments or in their magnitude; therefore, con-
cerning the second sentence, no new element of 
sentence can be added, no element can be 
augmented in magnitude, and there can be no 
tradeoff by increasing one element of a sen-
tence by reference to a decrease in another 
element. State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah 
1981). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law AJLR. — Defendant's right to disclosure of 
§ 596. presentence report, 40 A.L.R.3d 681. 
CJJS. — 24 C J.S. Criminal Law § 1506. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law ** 1208(2). 
76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or 
prior sentence set aside. 
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on 
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same 
offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more 
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously 
satisfied. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Assault against peace officer. 
Evidence of assault. 
—Sufficient. 
Cited. 
Assault against peace officer. 
This section and i 76-6-102.4 do not pro-
scribe identical conduct when the assault is 
against a peace officer. The statutes apply to 
different classes of persons, the former apply-
ing to "any person" and the latter applying to 
•any prisoner." State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Evidence of assault. 
Where, as part of standard jail procedure, the 
videotape of all bookings, including the defen-
dant's, was erased and recycled after 72 hours if 
there was no request to retain it, and the 
defendant sought dismissal of the charge that 
she, while in custody, had assaulted a police 
officer, because there was no showing that loss 
of the tape destroyed evidence vital to the issue 
of the defendant's guilt, the trial court erred in 
dismissing the assault charge. State v. Jiminez, 
761 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Sufficient. 
Jury verdict, implicitly rejecting statutory 
defenses of self-defense and defense of habita-
tion, was supported by the evidence. State v. 
Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Cited in State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah 
Ct App. 1994). 
76-5-102.6. Assault on a correctional officer. 
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material or any other 
substance or object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953,76-5-102.6, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 59 be-
1992, ch. 149, § 1; 1994, ch. 37, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1994, inserted "or other-
wise propels.n 
came effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to 
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Spitting. 
Spitting on a correctional officer was not a 
crime under this section, as the only prohibited 
means of propelling a substance or object was 
by throwing. State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993) (decided before 1994 amendment 
adding "or otherwise propels"). 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; 
1989, ch. 170, § 2. 
Cross-References.—Attempt, § 76-4-101. 
Possession of a dangerous weapon with in-
tent to assault, § 76-10-507. 
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76-5-104. Consensual altercation no defense to homicide 
or assault if dangerous weapon used. 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of this chapter or 
assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that the defendant was a party to 
any duel, mutual combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course 
of the duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601 was used. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-104, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-104; 1989, ch. 170, § 3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and Key Numbers. — Assault and Battery *=» 
Battery §§ 66, 68. 65. 
C.J.S. —6AC.J.S. Assault and Battery § 85. 
76-5-105. Mayhem. 
[(1)] Every person who unlawfully and intentionally deprives a human being 
of a member of his body, or disables or renders it useless, or who cuts out or 
disables the tongue, puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or Up, is guilty of 
mayhem. 
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-105, enacted by L. tion designation "(l)" was added by the com-
1973, ch. 196, { 76-5-105. piler. 
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed subsec-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Instructions. nose, instructions on defendant's intoxication, 
In prosecution for mayhem, arising from de- flight, and intent were not erroneous. State v. 
fendant's alleged biting offend of sister-in-law's Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 R2d 692 (1935). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mayhem and C.J.S. — 56 C.J.S. Mayhem § 3. 
Related Offenses § 1. Key Numbers. — Mayhem «=» 7. 
76-5-106. Harassment. 
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to frighten or harass 
another, he communicates in writing a threat to commit any violent felony. 
(2) Harassment is a class C misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-106, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, S 76-5-106. 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT 76-8-1001 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 70 Am. Jur. 2d Sedition, Key Numbers. — Insurrection and Sedition 
Subversive Activities, and Treason § 103. *=» 2. 
C.J.S. — 46 C J.S. Insurrection and Sedition 
§2. 
PART 10 
HABITUAL CRIMINALS 
76-8-1001. Habitual criminal — Determination. 
Any person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for 
felony ofiFenses at least one of which ofiFenses having been at least a felony of 
the second degree or a crime which, if committed within this state would have 
been a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of second degree, and 
was committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at least a felony of the 
second degree committed in this state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state 
prison for from five years to life. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-1001, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 46, § 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Attempted first degree murder. 
Interpretation of statute. 
No separate sentence. 
Prior convictions. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Presumption of regularity. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Fact that habitual criminal statute allows 
prosecutor discretion whether or not to charge 
defendant under its provisions does not make it 
unconstitutional. State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 
1275 (Utah 1978). 
This section and § 76-8-1002 do not violate 
federal constitutional provisions against dou-
ble jeopardy. The statutes do not create a new 
crime; they merely enhance punishment for 
the latest crime in cases where the defendant 
has been previously convicted of and sent to 
prison for two other felony offenses. State v. 
Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985). 
Separate and consecutive sentence for being 
a habitual criminal subjected defendant to dou-
ble jeopardy; his habitual criminal sentences 
should have been merged with his sentences 
for the underlying offenses. State v. Williams, 
773 P.2d 1368 (1989). 
Attempted first degree murder. 
Since attempted first degree murder is not 
excepted in the habitual criminal statute, trial 
court did not err in using defendant's convic-
tion for that crime as the underlying substan-
tive offense to trigger the habitual criminal 
statute. State v. Johnson, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 
6 (1989). 
Interpretation of statute. 
Intent of this statute is to make persistent 
offenders subject to greater sanctions, and not 
to reform. Therefore, the particular sequence of 
prior crimes is immaterial, and defendant was 
treated properly where he had served only two 
weeks of the first prior commitment when the 
second prior commitment began to run. State 
v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187 (Utah 1983). 
Trial court properly instructed the jury that 
the word "committed" means the order by 
which a person is sent to prison, that each time 
a person is ordered sent to prison in carrying 
out a sentence, that person is being committed, 
and that it is irrelevant whether multiple com-
mitments are to be served concurrently or con-
secutively. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 
(Utah 1987). 
No separate sentence. 
This section does not create a new crime; it 
merely enhances punishment for the latest 
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exact equivalent of the latter. State v. Smith, 
90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936). 
Where rape with force or violence is charged, 
assault is an included offense. State v. Smith, 
90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936). 
In criminal action charging defendant with 
crime of carnally and unlawfully knowing a 
female over age of thirteen years and under 
age of eighteen years, it was proper for court to 
instruct jury on lesser offense of attempt to 
commit the crime. State v. Brande, 115 Utah 
85, 202 P.2d 556 (1949). 
The offense of simple assault is included in 
the offense of indecent assault. State v. Close, 
28 Utah 2d 144, 499 R2d 287 (1972). 
Unanimous verdict 
To fulfill the constitutional requirement of 
jury unanimity, the jury must agree on a ver-
dict, but it is not necessary that they agree cm 
the theory of guilt when the prosecution 
presents evidence supporting alternative theo-
ries. State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987) 
(second-degree murder); State v. Tillman, 750 
P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) (first-degree murder). 
Verdict forms. 
There is no statute in this state requiring 
the court to prepare forms of verdict. It has, 
however, been the general practice of-trial 
courts to do that, and it might be that, when 
they undertook to do so, they should have pre-
pared forms as complete as the case requires 
State v. Romeo, 42 Utah 46,128 P. 530 (1912), 
overruled on other grounds, State v. Crank, 
105 Utah 332, 142 PJ2d 178 (1943). 
Cited in State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75B Am. Jur. 2d Trial 
§ 1750 et seq. 
CJ.S. — 23ACJ.S. Criminal Law § 1395 et 
•eq. 
AX.R. — Inconsistency of criminal verdict 
as between two or more defendants tried to-
gether, 22 AUELSd 717. 
Juror's reluctant, equivocal or conditional 
assent to verdict, on polling, as ground for mis-
Rule 21.5. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Rule 21.5, establishing proce-
dure for pleas claiming mental illness or insan-
trial or new trial in criminal case, 25 AJLJEUd 
1149. 
Validity and efficacy of accused's waiver of 
unanimous verdict, 97 AX.R.3d 1253. 
Requirement of jury unanimity as to mode of 
committing crime under statute setting forth 
the various modes by which offense may be 
committed, 75 A.L.R.4th 91. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «- 636(8), 
870 to 894. 
ity, was repealed effective January 1,1996. For 
similar provisions, see i 77-16a-103. 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
* (b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
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(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
rf Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the 
court shall *o specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1995, substituted 
\5 days" for "30 days" in the first sentence in 
Subdivision (a). 
The 1996 amendment made several stylistic 
changes to delete masculine pronouns and 
tided Subdivision <f). 
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investi-
gation, t 76-3-404. 
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing 
and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, U.R.E. 
Suspending imposition of sentence and plac-
ing defendant on probation, S 77-18-1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Advising defendant of right to appeal 
Appellate review. 
Illegal sentence. 
Jurisdiction. 
Sentences. 
—Habitual offenders. 
—Indefinite suspension of sentence. 
Sentencing hearing. 
--Continued hearing. 
—Evidence. 
Delinquency record. 
Polygraph examination. 
—Presentence report 
—Presence of counsel. 
—Presence of defendant 
—Time. 
Continuance for defendant. 
Waiver. 
Statements before sentencing. 
—Defendant 
Validity of conviction. 
Cited. 
Advising defendant of right to appeal 
Trial court's failure to again advise defen-
dant of his right to appeal at sentencing was 
harmless error where trial court had informed 
him of such right at the trial and after the 
verdict, and he did not object to the timeliness 
of the court's advice. Crowe v. State, 649 PJ2d 2 
(Utah 1982). 
Appellate review. 
Subdivision (e) of this rule permits the court 
of appeals to consider the legality of a sentence 
even if the issue is raised for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Brooks, 278 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 
(Utah 1995). 
Subdivision (e) of this rule does not allow an 
appellate court to review the legality of a sen-
tence when the substance of the appeal is not a 
challenge to the sentence itself, but to the un-
derlying conviction. State v. Brooks, 278 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1995). 
Illegal sentence. 
A district court may reassume jurisdiction to 
correct an erroneous and void sentence, irre-
spective of the time limits. State v. Lee lim, 79 
Utah 68, 7 P^d 825 (1932). 
Defendant must first ask the trial court to 
correct his sentence if he believes that it has 
been imposed in an illegal manner. State v. 
Brooks, 868 FM 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
affd, 278 Utah Adv. Bep. 5 (Utah 1995). 
Jurisdiction. 
Because an illegal sentence is void, the court 
does not lose jurisdiction over the sentence 
until the sentence has been corrected; however, 
once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State 
v. Montoya, 825 PJ2d 676 (Utah Ct App. 1991). 
Sentences. 
—Habitual offenders. 
A justice of the peace, after imposing a fine 
for drunkenness for violation of a city ordi-
nance, could not thereafter impose a jail sen-
tence under those provisions of ordinance pro-
viding for cumulative punishment for a second 
or subsequent offense, without taking evidence 
upon the question of the previous conviction. 
Ex parte Mulliner, 101 Utah 51,117 P.2d 819 
(1941). 
—Indefinite suspension of sentence. 
The court, by indefinitely suspending sen-
tence, and permitting defendant to go on his 
own recognizance, lost jurisdiction of him, so 
that it could not afterwards have him rear-
rested, and sentence him. In re Flint, 25 Utah 
838, 71 P. 531, 95 Am. St R. 853 (1903). 
Sentencing hearing. 
—Continued hearing. 
Failure to advise accused of nature of the 
charge, his plea and the verdict thereon at a 
sentencing proceeding which was a continua-
tion of a prior sentence hearing was not revers-
ible error where defendant was adequately ap-
prised of that information in the initial pro-
ceeding, although it would have been prefera-
ble for defendant to have been advised of those 
facts in the continued proceeding. State v. 
McClendon, 611 PM 728 (Utah 1980). 
—Evidence. 
Delinquency record. 
A record of delinquency is not admissible in 
the guilt phase of a trial even though it is rele-
vant and material to the issues, but the limita-
tion goes only to the use of the delinquency 
record as "evidence" and is not a bar to consid-
eration in the sentencing phase of a criminal 
case. State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah 
1980). 
Polygraph examination. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
